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Abstract 
We demonstrate the central importance of creditors’ ability to use movable assets as collateral (as distinct 
from immovable real estate) when borrowing from banks. Using a unique cross-country micro-level loan 
data set containing loan-to-value ratios for different assets, we find that loan-to-values of loans 
collateralized with movable assets are lower in countries with weak collateral laws, relative to immovable 
assets, and that lending is biased toward the use of immovable assets. Using sector-level data, we find that 
weak movable collateral laws create distortions in the allocation of resources that favor immovable-based 
production and investment. An analysis of Slovakia’s collateral law reform confirms our findings. 
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The ability of creditors to enforce their contracts with debtors is fundamental to the market for 
credit. A debtor who cannot commit to repay her loan finds it difficult, if not impossible, to obtain one. 
Over the past two decades, scores of academic articles have demonstrated the validity and importance of 
creditors’ rights for the supply of credit by showing how cross-country differences in the rights of 
creditors and reforms within countries that improve creditors’ rights are associated with dramatic 
differences in the supply of bank credit and economic growth.1 In this paper, we provide evidence on a 
new channel through which legal systems affect debt contracting and, in turn, credit supply and real 
economic activity. We demonstrate the central importance of creditors’ ability to use movable assets as 
collateral (as distinct from immovable real estate) when borrowing from banks.  
Movable assets consist of all non–real estate assets (such as machinery, accounts receivable, and 
inventory). According to the World Bank, creditors in emerging markets are usually reluctant to accept 
movable assets as collateral (Fleisig, Safavian, and De La Peña, 2006). That is a major problem for firms 
that rely on bank credit, because movable assets are central to the production processes of many firms in 
developed and emerging market countries and, in the absence of legal system shortcomings, are the most 
important class of collateral used in bank credit. For example, within the United States, 63% of 
collateralized loans made to small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) are collateralized by movable 
assets.2 In this paper, we argue that the root of the inability to make use of movables collateral in many 
                                                      
1 King and Levine (1993), Levine and Zervos (1998), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 
1998), Taylor (1998), and Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000) employ innovative statistical techniques to identify 
cross-country patterns. A later group of scholars—most notably Rajan and Zingales (1998), Wurgler (2000), 
Cetorelli and Gambera (2001), Fisman and Love (2004), and Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2008)—focus 
on the development of sectors as well as countries, and they reach the same conclusion,that is, finance leads growth. 
Research focusing on the growth of regions within countries by Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), Black and Strahan 
(2002), Guiso, Sapienza, Zingales. (2004), Cetorelli and Strahan (2006), Dehejia and Lleras-Muney (2007), and 
Correa (2008) produce broadly similar results. Also, various articles focus on how creditors’ rights differences affect 
the structure of loans and the identity of lenders. See, for example, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), Qian 
and Strahan (2007), Bae and Goyal (2009), and Liberti and Mian (2010). 
2 Specifically, 46% of collateralized loans are collateralized by machinery, and 17% are collateralized by inventory 
and accounts receivable. Data on collateralized lending for SMEs in the US come from the Federal Reserve Board’s 
Survey of Small Business Finance (SSBF). The SSBF combines accounts receivable and inventory. Accounts 





emerging markets reflects problems in legal regimes governing movables collateral use. Each country has 
a collateral law for immovable assets and another law for movable assets. Although collateral laws for 
real estate loans tend to be relatively well developed worldwide, creditors in many countries are reluctant 
to lend against movable assets because their legal systems limit the usefulness of such assets as collateral. 
Legal systems for movables are weak in three dimensions: (1) they limit the scope of movable assets that 
can be used as collateral, (2) they lack centralized registration systems to monitor the security interests (to 
make sure no other lender has rights to the same collateral), and (3) they allow enforcement in the event 
of default only through courts.3  
We explore how the sophistication of a country’s collateral laws for movable assets affects loan 
supply, reflected in the loan-to-value ratios (LTVs) for loans secured by movables assets compared with 
loans against immovable assets. We employ a novel cross-country micro-level data set containing small 
and medium business secured loans issued by an anonymous global bank (which we label “GlobalBank”) 
in 12 emerging market countries. One advantage of the data set is that it provides information regarding 
the liquidation value of the asset being pledged as collateral.4 This allows us to construct comparable 
LTVs, using meaningful measures of asset value, for loans collateralized by different types of assets, 
which is something that the previous literature has been unable to do, due to the lack of data on asset 
liquidation values.  
Another novel contribution of our study is our analysis of how different countries’ treatment of 
movable assets as collateral shapes the allocation of resources across sectors. Because emerging market 
finance is typically bank debt, and is often collateralized, constraints on LTV and debt capacity should 
                                                                                                                                                                              
secured lending and short-term business loans. A firm would use the value of its accounts receivable and inventory 
as collateral to secure financing to produce and sell its products and services. The financing is then repaid by 
converting the inventory to cash, either directly or through the collection of accounts receivables (see Udell, 2004). 
See Appendix Table A2 for details.  
3 Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) governs secured transactions for movable assets in the US. 
According to the UCC, security interests over movables are well defined, are easily registered, and can be seized 
easily if default occurs without the necessity of a judicial procedure (see Section 9-607). 
4 As per GlobalBank credit manuals, the asset value is the fair market value that a willing and informed buyer would 





also constrain economic activity.5 We analyze how collateral laws affect the sectoral allocation of 
production and investment between movable-intensive and immovable-intensive producers using sector-
level output and investment data covering the universe of manufacturing firms in our sample of countries.  
We first investigate how the lending supply behavior of GlobalBank responds to differences in 
the quality of collateral protection for movable assets. We identify within-country differences in LTV 
across loans collateralized with movable and immovable assets for a single lender. Next, we examine how 
these within-country differences in loan supply and LTV are affected by different legal treatments of 
movable collateral. We measure cross-country differences in the quality of movable collateral laws using 
World Bank data from Doing Business to focus on each country’s legal treatment of the three components 
of effectively secured transactions (creation, monitoring, and enforcement) over movable collateral. We 
start by showing that movables-backed loans are more frequent in countries with strong legal frameworks 
for movable collateral (strong-law countries) than in countries with weak legal frameworks (weak-law 
countries). Next, we show that LTVs for loans collateralized by movable assets are higher in strong-law 
countries, but that LTVs for loans collateralized by immovable assets are similar across countries. 
According to our difference-in-differences estimation, LTVs of loans collateralized with movable assets 
are on average 27.6 percentage points higher, relative to LTVs for loans collateralized by immovable 
assets, in strong-law countries relative to weak-law countries. 
 One concern in interpreting our cross-sectional regressions is the influence of omitted factors that 
could explain the observed relation between collateral laws and debt contracting. We deal with this 
concern in two ways. First, we control for country characteristics that could affect the LTVs of movable 
and immovable assets differentially, such as the efficiency of contract enforcement, efficiency of 
bankruptcy procedures, rule of law, and property rights. Our results are robust to controlling for these 
                                                      
5 According to the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys, which are performed in more than one hundred countries, 
collateral is required for bank loans in 75% of loans worldwide. Moreover, the lack of collateral is one of the 
primary reasons for the rejection of credit (Fleisig, Safavian, and De La Peña, 2006). Understanding the effects of 
movable collateral laws on production is particularly important given that on average 78% of developing countries’ 





variables. Second, we take advantage of the fact that one of the countries in our sample—Slovakia—
improved all three components of movable collateral law during our sample period. To provide further 
causal evidence on the effects of collateral laws, we examine the lending behavior in Slovakia around the 
collateral law reform. Examining collateral in a within-borrower framework, we find that the LTVs for 
movable assets rose substantially after the policy reform, relative to immovable assets. The magnitude of 
this within-borrower change (20 percentage points) is similar to the magnitude of the cross-country 
difference between weak- and strong-law countries. To address the concern that the Slovakia results could 
be driven by other shocks or policies affecting movable and immovable assets differentially, we conduct a 
placebo test using the experience of the Czech Republic, a country that did not reform its collateral law. 
Given the similarities between the two countries, it is plausible that both were exposed to similar shocks. 
We falsely assume that the Czech Republic reformed at the same time as Slovakia, but we reject that 
assumption, finding no change over time in the LTVs for loans backed by movable assets in the Czech 
Republic.  
To investigate the consequences of collateral laws for real economic activity, we study how 
collateral law differences affect the sectoral allocation of resources among manufacturing firms.  Our 
measures of sectoral composition are from United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
(UNIDO) data, which provide each country’s sector-specific output and investment for 22 sectors. The 
sample of countries covered by UNIDO is more extensive than the GlobalBank sample of emerging 
market countries we employ in our analysis of lending. We measure exogenous immovable asset intensity 
of each manufacturing sector using data for the US sectoral composition of assets (ratio of value of land 
and buildings to total assets), which should be relatively free from distortions related to ineffective 
movable collateral laws. Examining the within-country allocation of resources across collateral law 
frameworks for the 12 GlobalBank countries, we find that weak-law countries allocate 15.4% more 





rate in immovable-intensive sectors in weak-law countries is 3 percentage points higher than in strong-
law countries. Results for a broader sample of 76 countries are similar but of smaller magnitude. 
We recognize that objections could be raised to our ordinary least squares (OLS) results on 
sectoral allocation because of concerns about endogeneity bias due to either omitted variables or reverse 
causality. With respect to the possibility of reverse causality, countries with a comparative advantage in 
real estate–intensive sectors might not have as great a need for a strong movable law. We address that 
potential problem in two ways. First, we show that no correlation exists between the collateral law index 
and a measure of natural resource abundance, which shows that the most obvious source of reverse 
causality is implausible empirically. Second, we employ differences in legal origin as an instrument for 
differences in collateral laws and find that, under the assumed exclusion restriction, the observed 
association between collateral law quality and sectoral allocation appears to be the result of exogenous 
variation in collateral laws.  
Instrumenting with legal origin provides strong evidence against reverse causality, but, with 
respect to concerns about omitted variables, legal origin can be correlated with other omitted country 
characteristics that affect sectoral allocation, which would violate the exclusion restriction. We consider 
that the ability to collateralize using movable assets can be a proxy for other protections of creditors’ 
rights. To address that concern, we control for differences in the efficiency of contract enforcement, 
efficiency of bankruptcy procedures, rule of law, and property rights. The results remain unchanged. Not 
only does the inclusion of these controls not affect our regression findings regarding the importance of the 
ability to collateralize with movables, but our results also are stronger in countries with poorer legal 
efficiency. This reflects the fact that collateral rights for movables often are most important in countries 
where courts operate poorly, because these collateral rights often provide a means of avoiding lengthy 
court deliberations. One could be concerned that some of these variables are endogenous, which would 
mean that adding them as controls does not fully eliminate the possibility of omitted variables bias. To 





after its movable asset collateral reform. Consistent with our cross-sectional results, we find important 
sectoral shifts in production in favor of movables-intensive producers after the reform.  
Finally, we investigate which aspects of legal system differences are most important for 
explaining our results. We find that the existence of collateral registries to record security interests over 
movable assets and the possibility of enforcing security interests without court intervention, not the mere 
existence of laws permitting the collateralization of movable assets, drive our results. When we control 
for out-of-court enforcement for immovable assets, we find that the movable-enforcement coefficient 
remains unchanged and the immovable-enforcement coefficient is not statistically significant. This 
suggests that out-of-court enforcement is more valuable for movable than immovable assets, because 
movables can depreciate more quickly and disappear more easily. 
In summary, our paper makes four important and novel contributions. First, we highlight the 
importance of movable assets in providing debt capacity. We stress the important role of working capital 
in raising debt, something that the previous literature has overlooked. Second, we identify a new channel 
through which collateral rights on movable assets drive important cross-country variation in debt 
contracting. Third, as a result of data constraints, prior analyses employ proxies for the liquidation value 
of assets.6 Because we have detailed data on asset liquidation values, our paper is the first to employ the 
estimated LTV ratios used by lenders for different asset classes as a measure of debt capacity. Fourth, we 
are the first to analyze how creditors’ rights influences on credit supply affect the composition of 
aggregate real economic activity. 
Although we are the first to analyze the linkages among collateral laws, LTVs, and sectoral 
allocation, a number of papers investigate how cross-country differences in the supply of credit is 
explained by the existence and enforcement of secured creditors’ rights, especially with respect to 
                                                      
6 For example, Benmelech, Garmaise, and Moskowitz (2005) and Benmelech (2009) employ property-specific 
zoning assignments and diversity of track gauges in 19th century American railroads, respectively, to capture 
variation in liquidation values. Ono, Uchida, Udell, Uesugi (2015) estimate the liquidation value of real estate 





collateralization.7 Liberti and Mian (2010) show that collateral is a binding constraint on lending and that 
this constraint tends to bind more in relatively underdeveloped financial markets. They show that the 
spread in collateral between high- and low-risk borrowers decreases with the degree of financial 
development of the economies.8 Cerqueiro, Ongena, Roszbach (2014) study the effects of a 2004 Swedish 
law that exogenously reduced the value of collateral. They find that, even in a country as developed as 
Sweden, this change produced increases in interest rates on loans, tightened credit limits, reduced 
investments in monitoring collateral values and borrowers, and resulted in higher delinquency rates on 
loans. Haselmann, Pistor, and Vig (2010) show in their study of legal reforms in Eastern Europe’s 
transition economies that changes in collateral laws mattered more for the supply of credit than changes in 
bankruptcy laws. 
Our paper is also close in spirit to Campello and Larrain (2016), who provide a detailed case 
study of a Romanian legal reform that permitted movable assets to be pledged as collateral. They show 
that the reform broadened access to credit, particularly for firms operating in sectors making intensive use 
of movable capital, resulting in a sharp increase in the employment and capital stock share of those firms. 
They analyze the problem from the point of view of the firms, because they have access to balance sheet 
                                                      
7 Large theoretical and empirical literatures examine the role of collateral in loan contracting, which we do not 
review in detail here, including Lacker (2001), Bester (1985), Chan and Thakor (1987), Berger and Udell (1990), 
Boot and Thakor (1994), Rajan and Winton (1995), Gorton and Kahn (2000), Longhofer and Santos (2000), John, 
Lynch, and Puri (2003), Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2003), Benmelech, Garmaise, and 
Moskowitz (2005), Jimènez, Salas, and Saurina (2006), Gan (2007), Djankov, McLiesh, Shleifer (2007), Ono and 
Uesugi (2009), Benmelech (2009), Benmelech and Bergman (2009, 2011), Berger, Frame, and Ioannidou. (2011), 
Berger, Kick, Koetter, and Schaeck (2013), Godlewski and Weill (2011), Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar (2012), 
Rampini and Viswanathan (2013), Campello and Giambona (2013), and Mann (2015). Some recent work has 
qualified some of the earlier discussions of the effects of collateral rights by showing that increases in creditors’ 
rights to collateral that reduce debtors’ bargaining power, particularly with respect to the disposition of collateral, 
can reduce the amount of lending through contractions in demand, even when the supply of lending increases 
(Lilienfeld-Toal, Mookherjee, and Visaria (2012), Vig (2013). 
8 Both Liberti and Mian (2010) and our paper use GlobalBank as a test laboratory. While Liberti and Mian explore 
cross-sectionally how differences in financial development impact collateralization rates, we analyze cross-
sectionally and within-country how differences in movable laws impact debt capacity measured by LTV. This 
allows us to construct a precise link between the institution of a country (i.e., movable law) and the asset pledged 
(i.e., movable asset). Besides analyzing the effects on lending, we analyze the effects on real economic activity. In 
terms of data, the sample of borrowers and countries in Liberti and Mian (2010) is different from ours due to the 
filtering restrictions we apply. Also, we estimate LTV using the fair market liquidation value, as is typical in real 
estate–backed loans, while the collateralization rate in Liberti and Mian (2010) employs the net asset liquidation 





data on firms’ total debt. Our paper complements their work by analyzing the problem from the point of 
view of the creditors, which we can do because we have access to more granular loan-level data with 
information on the assets pledged as collateral. Moreover, we extend their work by analyzing the 
consequences of movable collateral laws on aggregate economic activity.9 
We also contribute to the literature that examines different aspects of creditors’ rights. 
Differences in creditors’ rights can reflect alternative bankruptcy rules (e.g., the rules governing 
reorganization versus liquidation), differences in the rights of secured versus unsecured creditors, 
different protections for various types of security interests (in real estate versus movable assets), 
differences in the ways collateral rights are enforced, and differences in the extent to which the judicial 
system enforces these rules impartially and expeditiously. For example, Jappelli, Pagano, and Bianco 
(2005), Chemin (2010), and Ponticelli (2013) show that the way rights are enforced, or not, by courts can 
be as important as the existence of rights as a matter of law. Our results complement this literature by 
showing that out-of-court enforcement can work as a substitute for an inefficient judiciary. That is, 
making courts less important could be beneficial for financial contracting. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses data sources. Section 3 
describes our identification strategy. Section 4 reports empirical findings related to GlobalBank’s lending 
in 12 emerging market countries and the collateral reform in Slovakia. Section 5 provides additional 
results for the GlobalBank lending analysis. Section 6 examines the effects on the sectoral allocation of 




                                                      
9 Love, Martinez Peria, and Singh (2015) use the World Bank’s firm-level surveys for a large sample of countries to 
explore the impact of introducing collateral registries for movable assets on firms’ access to bank finance. They find 





2. Data sources 
Our study employs data primarily from three sources: the detailed lending records of an 
anonymous global bank, the World Bank’s Doing Business data (including components of those data that 
are not publicly available), and UNIDO data on countries’ sectoral allocation of production. 
 GlobalBank provided data on secured loans it makes to small and medium-size enterprises during 
the years 2002–2004 in 16 emerging market countries. In our study, we include loans that are 
collateralized either by immovables (real estate assets) or by movables (machinery, inventory, and 
accounts receivable). We exclude loans collateralized by both types of collateral from our sample, 
because for these loans we cannot gauge the relative contribution of each type of collateral. Four of the 16 
countries (Brazil, Republic of Korea, South Africa, and Taiwan), however, had too few observations of 
real estate–collateralized loans to be included in our study and so we were left with data for 12 countries 
(Chile, Czech Republic, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Romania, Singapore, Slovakia, 
Sri Lanka, and Turkey).10 We have access to all the asset-backed programs that GlobalBank developed in 
emerging markets during the early 2000s as part of an embedded bank strategy. One of the main goals of 
this strategy was for GlobalBank to act as a genuinely local bank to compete with local banks in these 
regions. 
Given the cross-sectional nature of the main regression analysis, we include one loan per firm in 
our sample.  With multiple loans per borrower, we use the first observed loan. Loans and firms are 
dropped from the sample as the result of the various sample exclusion criteria. We begin 
with 7,056 single-collateral loans and 2,803 multiple-collateral loans contracted with a total 
of 8,379 firms in our sample of 16 countries. We drop 2,620 firms with 2,881 loans that are located in one 
of the four excluded countries. For the other 12 countries, we begin with 4,691 single-collateral loans 
and 2,287 multiple-collateral loans, which are made to 5,759 firms. We exclude 467 of the 
                                                      
10 We are unaware of the reasons that real estate–collateralized lending by GlobalBank to SMEs is absent in Brazil, 





single-collateral loans and 671 of the multiple-collateral loans in these 12 countries from our main tests 
because they are collateralized by supra-collateral loans, which formally is a category of movable assets. 
Our total sample of loans collateralized either by movables or immovables for the 12 countries 
includes 4,224 loans (and firms), 1,128 of which are collateralized by movable assets and 3,096 of 
which are collateralized by immovable assets. 
We measure loan quantity as the term-loan amount or the amount drawn on a line of credit. We 
define the liquidation value of the pledged asset as the fair market liquidation value of the collateral as 
appraised by GlobalBank. This value does not include a discount due to asset fire sales or the presence of 
constrained buyers, as in Shleifer and Vishny (1992). In terms of the internal process to determine the 
liquidation value, an external independent assessor or appraiser determines the price that a willing and 
informed buyer would pay to a willing and informed seller when neither party is under pressure to 
conclude the transaction.11 Unfortunately, we are unable to observe interest rate data at the individual 
loan-contract level because we obtain the data from GlobalBank’s risk-management division located in 
New York. This division is not responsible for collecting and assessing interest rate data at the loan-
contract level. 
 In addition to the loan categories already mentioned, we include another category of loans—supra 
collateral loans—which adds another 467 loans (and firms) to our sample, bringing the total sample to 
4,691 loans. The supra-collateral category contains loans collateralized by cash deposits or other cash 
assets placed in GlobalBank or by foreign cash deposits, as well as loans backed by commercial letters of 
credit enforced abroad (related to importand export lending) or by standby letters of credit or other credit 
guarantees enforced outside of the borrowing firm’s country.12 Foreign deposits, local cash deposits, 
                                                      
11 See Degryse, Ioannidou, Liberti, Sturgess (2014) on how legal institutions across countries affect the relation 
between the appraised liquidation value and the minimum expected recovery value that the bank estimates for 
different types of collateral. 
12 Using cash as collateral has several advantages. From the lender’s standpoint, cash collateral is a cost-effective 
secured lending method because, in the case of default and if collateral is seized, repossession costs are minimized. 





certificates of deposits, and bonds are forms of cash asset collateral that enjoy the legal right of 
recoupment or setoff, which means that the bank effectively has immediate access to these forms of 
collateral without relying on collateral laws governing movable assets. Standby letters and other letters of 
credit or guarantees typically are provided by subsidiaries of GlobalBank in a foreign country or by other 
acceptable counterparty banks with good reputation and with which GlobalBank has daily operations.13  
To measure differences across countries in strength of movable collateral laws, we turn to the 
World Bank’s Doing Business data set to construct an index that captures the ability to use movable assets 
effectively in loan contracts. The World Bank captures many different aspects of collateral laws through 
various components that it measures, and its staff kindly agreed to share those individual component 
measures for our sample of countries for the year 2005, which is the first year for which data are 
available. 
The World Bank measures are based on a questionnaire administered to financial lawyers and 
verified through analysis of laws and regulations as well as public sources of information on collateral 
laws. Doing Business provides information on eight different features of collateral laws and gives each 
feature a zero or one score. We construct a movable collateral law index (MC Law Index) for each 
country by summing the scores of seven of those components.14 Thus, the MC Law Index ranges from 
zero to seven. A score of one is assigned for the following features of the laws, each of which is important 
for the ability of creditors to use movable assets as loan collateral. 
1. The law allows a business to grant a non-possessory security right in a single category of movable 
assets, without requiring a specific description of the collateral. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
borrowers in our data could have problems gaining access to unsecured credit, supra-collateral can be used as a 
means to solve these imperfections. 
13 Letters of credit are regulated by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and Uniform Customs and 
Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP), which control the terms of the letter of credit and the payment procedure 
for drawing upon it. 
14 Our results are invariant to including the eighth component in our MC Law Index, but we do not do so because we 
believe that this component contains significant errors. The omitted component pertains to the following feature: 
“Any business may use movable assets as collateral while keeping possession of the assets, and any financial 
institution may accept such assets as collateral.” We find that this variable almost always takes the value of one in 





2. The law allows a business to grant a non-possessory security right in substantially all its movable 
assets, without requiring a specific description of the collateral. 
3. A security right can be given over future or after-acquired movable assets and can extend 
automatically to the products, proceeds or replacements of the original assets. 
4. A general description of debts and obligations is permitted in the collateral agreement and in 
registration documents. All types of debts and obligations can be secured between the parties, and 
the collateral agreement can include a maximum amount for which the assets are encumbered. 
5. Secured creditors are paid first (for example, before tax claims and employee claims) when a 
debtor defaults outside an insolvency procedure. 
6. A collateral registry or registration institution for security interests over movable property is in 
operation, unified geographically and by asset type, with an electronic database indexed by 
debtors’ names. 
7. The law allows parties to agree in a movable collateral agreement that the lender can enforce its 
security right out of court. 
The first five features of the MC Law Index relate to the creation component of secured 
transactions. They determine the scope of movable assets that can be pledged as collateral. The sixth 
feature relates to the monitoring component; that is, creditors must register the security interest in a 
collateral registry to ensure that no other lender has rights over the same collateral. The seventh feature 
corresponds to the enforcement component. It determines whether the creditor is allowed to repossess the 
collateral (in the event of default) privately with the borrower, bypassing the court system. 
Because our loan data are available for the period 2002–2004, while our MC Law Index data are 
derived from 2005, we perform an extensive independent search to ensure that no reforms to secured 
lending laws in our 12 countries had occurred during the period 2002–2005. For all but one of the 12 
countries, we identify no changes during those years.  
The exception is Slovakia, which passed a major reform on the collateralization of movables in 
late 2002. Slovakia introduced a new secured transactions law, based on the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) Model Law on Secured Transactions. Prior to the passage of 
the law, creditors in Slovakia mostly relied on fiduciary transfer of title to secure their obligations. The 
new law allowed the creation of security interests over movable assets without having to transfer 
possession to the creditor. The law also gave creditors private enforcement rights, including the ability to 





introduction of the Charges Register, a modern centralized registry for security interests over movable 
assets, operated by Slovakia’s Chamber of Notaries. A security interest could be registered in minutes at 
any local office through an electronic terminal for as little as 30 euros. The reform was considered a 
success and became the subject of numerous press accounts. Annual filings in the collateral registry 
increased from 7,508 in 2003 to 31,968 in 2007, a per annum increase of over 50%. In January 2003, The 
Economist went so far as to qualify the reformed Slovak secured transactions law as “the world’s best 
rules on collateral.”15 
We obtain data on the sectoral composition of output by country from the United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization’s Industrial Statistics data set (INDSTAT-2). UNIDO provides 
yearly information for 22 two-digit manufacturing industries [International Standard Industrial 
Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC) revision 3] for a large number of countries for a large 
number of years. We use data on sectoral output measured in US dollars. We also obtain from UNIDO 
data on the sectoral investment rate, defined as the ratio between gross fixed capital formation and 
output.16 We construct a single cross section, averaging data for the period 2002–2004.  
Data for Sri Lanka and Pakistan are not available from this data source. Thus, the sample 
constructed to coincide with our GlobalBank sample consists of 220 observations corresponding to ten 
countries and 22 sectors. We also report regression results on the sectoral composition of output and the 
investment rate for a larger sample of 76 countries, which include many countries other than the ten 
countries that are in our GlobalBank data set. As before, we use the UNIDO data on sectoral composition 
and investment, and we use the World Bank data to construct our MC Law Index score for the countries 
included in this larger sample. 
 
                                                      
15 When we include Slovakia in the cross-sectional analysis of countries, we include loan observations only for the 
pre-reform period. When we separately analyze the changes in lending behavior within Slovakia over time, we 
include the entire Slovakian sample, to measure the effect of the reform on movables lending. 
16 Wurgler (2000) also uses gross investment data from UNIDO to study the link between financial markets and the 





3. Identification strategy 
In this section, we explain the identification strategies used in the two parts of our empirical 
analysis (the GlobalBank lending analysis and the sectoral output analysis) to confront potential problems 
of endogeneity bias related either to omitted variables or reverse causality. 
3.1. GlobalBank lending analysis  
For the lending analysis, we estimate the effect of collateral law strength on LTVs of 
movable-backed loans relative to immovable-backed loans. To do so, we exploit two sources of variation: 
variation in collateral law strength across countries and within-country variation across collateral types. 
We compare the difference between LTVs of loans collateralized by movable and immovable assets in 
countries with strong relative to weak collateral laws. Our identification assumption is that other country 
characteristics affect LTVs of movable and immovable collateral equally.  
We do not consider reverse causality to be a legitimate endogeneity concern in the lending 
analysis. It is implausible that the LTV of a given firm could affect the passage of the collateral law. 
However, an omitted variables problem could exist. That is, country characteristics correlated with 
movable collateral law could affect LTVs of movable and immovable collateral differentially. For 
example, if movable assets depreciate faster than immovable assets, movable assets could lose more value 
in a protracted bankruptcy proceeding, which could lead to a lower LTV for movable-backed loans. To 
deal with this concern, we control for four country variables that could affect movable and immovable 
assets differentially: the efficiency of contract enforcement, the efficiency of the bankruptcy procedure, 
rule of law, and property rights (in Subsection 4.1 we explain how we select these variables). We 
recognize that other unobserved country characteristics could affect movable and immovable assets 
differentially. To address that problem, we take advantage of the fact that one of the countries in our 





To analyze Slovakia’s 2003 reform, we exploit two sources of variation: within-firm variation 
across time and variation across collateral types. As long as unobserved country characteristics affecting 
movable and immovable assets differentially did not change with the reform, the pre-post comparison 
removes the influence of those unchanging effects. Our identification assumption is that any other country 
shocks at the time of the reform affected LTVs of movable and immovable collateral equally.  
One potential concern is that Slovakia joined the European Union (EU) in 2004. To become an 
EU member, a country has to implement and enforce all current EU rules. Slovakia could have 
implemented other policies affecting movable and immovable assets differentially at the moment of the 
collateral reform. In fact, Slovakia did not implement either a bankruptcy or a judicial reform at this time, 
which are the sorts of policies that could plausibly have a differential effect on the use of movable assets 
as effective collateral. 17  Nevertheless, other unobserved shocks could have affected movable and 
immovable assets differentially at the time of the collateral reform.  
To deal with that potential problem, we consider the experience of the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia’s neighbor, which did not reform its collateral law in 2003. Given the many similarities of the 
two countries (both were part of the same country until 1993, both have a similar industrial structure, and 
both joined the EU in 2004), it is reasonable to assume that they would have been subject to similar 
unobserved shocks around 2003. We therefore calculate the change in LTVs before and after 2003 in the 
Czech Republic, which should capture unobserved shocks affecting Slovakia around that time. 
The other potential issue with the GlobalBank analysis is selection bias. In the absence of a good 
legal framework for collateralized lending against movable assets, the composition of borrowers is likely 
to shift toward more seasoned credit risks that are less dependent on collateral. As a result, the LTVs of 
movable-backed loans in weak-law countries tend to be affected by the unobservably better fundamental 
credit risk of the sample, which acts to diminish the observed differences in LTVs on loans collateralized 
                                                      
17 Slovakia passed a new bankruptcy law in 2007 (four years after the collateral reform) and introduced a judicial 





by movable assets for strong- and weak-law countries. Moreover, the Slovakia analysis allows us to set 
aside selection issues, because we follow the same set of firms, before and after the collateral reform. 
3.2. Sectoral output analysis 
For the sectoral production analysis, we estimate the effect of movable collateral law strength on 
the output share of real estate–intensive versus non-intensive sectors. We again exploit two sources of 
variation: variation in collateral law strength across countries and within-county variation in real estate 
intensity across sectors. Our identification assumption is that other country characteristics affect the 
output share of real estate–intensive and non-intensive sectors equally.  
With respect to potential endogeneity bias for the sectoral analysis, both omitted variables and 
reverse causality are legitimate concerns. Reverse causality is a concern because countries with a 
comparative advantage in real estate–intensive sectors might not have as great a need to create strong 
movable collateral rights. The causality could therefore flow from an exogenously higher output share in 
real estate–intensive sectors to a weaker collateral law.  
We address that potential problem in two ways. First, we analyze the plausibility of the reverse 
causality argument. As a proxy for a country’s comparative advantage in real estate–intensive sectors, we 
use a measure of natural resource abundance, defined as the real value of petroleum, coal, natural gas, and 
metals produced per capita (Haber and Menaldo, 2011). The correlation between the MC Law Index and 
natural resource abundance is small (-0.017) and statistically insignificant (P-value of 0.852). Thus, it is 
not true that countries abundant in natural resources tend to have weaker movable collateral laws. 
 Second, we address the reverse causality concern using legal origin as instrument for movable 
collateral law. Clearly, legal origin precedes the establishment of any patterns related to industrial 
specialization, which makes legal origin a useful instrument for the purposes of considering the potential 
importance of reverse causality. To measure a country’s legal origin, we rely on the classification of La 





predictor of movable collateral law strength. Legal origin is ordinally ranked in terms of positive 
influence on collateral law as follows: English (highest), German (middle), and French (lowest).18 When 
we instrument with legal origin, the effect of movable collateral law on sectoral allocation remains large 
and statistically significant. 
With respect to omitted variables bias, instrumenting with legal origin is less convincing for 
resolving endogeneity concerns. A country’s legal origin could capture the effects of omitted country 
characteristics that affect sectoral allocation, which would violate the exclusion restriction. We address 
the omitted variables problems by controlling for the same country variables we used in the GlobalBank 
lending analysis. In addition, to deal with unobserved country characteristics, we examine the changes in 
the output shares of real estate–intensive sectors in Slovakia before and after its collateral reform. 
4. Movable asset collateral laws and GlobalBank’s lending 
 In this section, we analyze how differences across countries in the ability to collateralize loans 
with movable assets affected the collateral employed in GlobalBank loans for 12 emerging market 
countries. We also investigate the change in the use of movable assets as collateral within Slovakia after 
that country reformed its laws and procedures for collateralizing with movable assets. . 
4.1. Cross-country analysis 
We start by calculating the fraction of total GlobalBank loans collateralized by immovable assets 
in each country. For each of the 12 countries in our sample, we calculate the frequency of immovable-
backed loans. We then sort the countries into two groups: above-median MC Law Index score 
(strong-law) countries and below-median MC Law Index score (weak-law) countries. The average 
frequency of immovable-backed loans is 76.6% in weak-law countries and 69.6% in strong-law countries. 
                                                      
18 The French-legal origin countries are Chile, Romania, and Turkey; the German-legal origin countries are the 






The difference of 7 percentage points is statistically significant at the 1% level, which indicates that 
GlobalBank lends more against immovable assets in countries that have weak laws for movable collateral. 
 Next, we analyze the relation between collateral laws and loan-to-value ratios. Fig. 1 plots the 
differences in the average LTVs between GlobalBank loans collateralized by immovable and movable 
assets, against the MC Law Index. As the figure shows, loans collateralized by immovables have higher 
average LTVs, and the greater the value of the MC Law Index score, the less the difference between the 
LTVs for loans collateralized by immovables and movables. Fig. 1 is consistent with the notion that a 
greater legal ability to collateralize movable assets is associated with a greater supply of 
movable-collateralized loans, relative to immovables.  
[Insert Fig. 1 here] 
In Table 1, we compute the average LTVs for each of the two collateralized loan types in each 
country, as well as the average for countries with weak and strong collateral laws. As Table 1 shows, 
LTVs on loans collateralized by immovables are similar in weak-law and strong-law countries (0.817 for 
weak-law countries versus 0.912 for strong-law countries). However, for loans collateralized by movable 
assets, the average LTVs for the two groups are very different (0.454 versus 0.827).19 The fact that a 
difference exists in average LTVs for immovables lending between weak-law and strong-law countries 
indicates that weak-law countries can have broader creditors’ rights problems that affect LTVs for both 
movables and immovables. The spread in LTVs across immovable and movable collateral is 0.085 (= 
0.912 - 0.827) in strong-law countries and 0.364 (= 0.817 - 0.454) in weak-law countries, with the 
difference across legal frameworks significant at the 1% level. However, the ability to collateralize loans 
                                                      
19 The loan-to-value ratios we observe in countries with movable collateral legal regimes that make it easy to borrow 
against movable assets average about 83%, and loan-to-value ratios for immovable asset-based borrowing are even 
higher on average. These high ratios apply only to asset-based loans, not to the total assets of the firm. Furthermore, 
firms that rely on asset-based lending tend to be less mature or well-known firms, which are credit-constrained and 
unable to borrow unsecured debt by relying only on their expected cash flows. For both of these reasons, it is not 
surprising that firms operating in favorable legal environments exhibit high loan-to-value ratios on asset-based 





against movable assets is dissimilar. In weak-law countries, the inability to collateralize using movable 
assets results in much lower LTVs for movable-backed loans.20  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
To test the effect of movable collateral laws on LTVs, we run the following cross--sectional 
difference-in-differences estimation: 
!!!"#! = !! + !!"#$%&'! + !!"#! ∗!"#$%&'! + !!! + !!! ∗!"#$%&'! + !! ,!           (1) 
where !"#! is the loan-to-value ratio for a loan made to firm i and Lawc is a strong-law indicator variable 
that takes the value one if the country is above the median value of the MC Law Index score and zero 
otherwise. We use an indicator variable to reduce measurement error, because we believe that the equally 
weighted index might not be a precise indicator of the quality of collateral laws for movables.21 Movablei 
is a movable indicator variable that takes the value one if the loan is collateralized by a movable asset and 
zero otherwise. The specification includes a full set of country fixed effects (αc).22 The coefficient of 
primary interest is !, which is identified from the within-country variation across collateral types. The 
coefficient measures the difference between LTVs of loans collateralized by movable and immovable 
assets in strong-law countries, relative to the same difference in weak-law countries. 23   
                                                      
20 Appendix Table A1 provides detailed information on each country’s use of movable and immovable assets and 
the LTVs of loans collateralized by movables, immovables, or supra-collateral. Appendix Table A2 gives a 
breakdown of movable assets into two main subcategories—machinery and inventory plus accounts receivable—
which are employed in our discussion of robustness (Subsection 5.3). In emerging markets, movables loans tend to 
be backed more frequently by inventory and accounts receivable than by machinery, which is the opposite of the 
tendency in the U.S. That pattern is especially true in weak-law countries. We believe that the relative 
underutilization of machinery reflects substitution into machinery leasing, which is a way for firms to borrow the 
machinery (which remains the property of the lessor) without resorting to a bank loan. Also, for both types of 
countries, LTVs for machinery loans are a bit higher than for loans against inventory and accounts receivable. This 
also can reflect the availability of machinery leasing, which is generally employed by less creditworthy borrowers 
and, therefore, can result in higher average LTVs for loans against machinery. 
21 Our results are robust to using a continuous variable measuring the MC Law Index score and to dividing countries 
into finer categories, instead of above- and below-median levels of the MC Law Index (see Subsection 5.3). 
22 We cluster standard errors at the country level. Because we have a relatively small number of clusters, we 
compute the standard errors using block bootstrapping (see Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller, 2008). 





We include borrower-level characteristics to control for differences in the supply of collateral. Zi 
includes the bank’s internal measure of firm size, the bank’s internal risk rating, the ratio of net fixed 
assets-to-total assets, the ratio of cash-to-total assets, the ratio of accounts receivables-to-total assets, and 
the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA)-to-sales 24. Finally, 
we control for country characteristics related to the operation of the legal system, interacted with the 
movable indicator, which could affect LTVs of movable and immovable collateral differentially. Xc 
includes Time to Enforce a Contract, defined as the number of years required to enforce a contract, Time 
to Resolve Insolvency, defined as the number of years required to resolve an insolvency procedure, Rule 
of Law, which captures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, 
and Property Rights, which captures the extent to which private economic activity is facilitated by an 
effective legal system.25 We chose these four legal system control variables on the basis of an analysis 
reported in Table A3. We considered a broad range of legal and macroeconomic variables, and we 
investigated the extent to which any of them was correlated with loan-to-value ratios on loans. We find 
that only four of the measures (our four chosen controls) co-vary significantly with LTVs.26 We include 
only two controls at a time in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2, given the limited number of countries in our 
sample. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Table 2 reports the LTV regression results, for different specifications. The Law*Movable 
interaction term is positive, large, statistically significant, and stable across all three specifications. 
According to the results of control Column 1, the difference between the LTV of movables and 
immovables-collateralized loans is 27.6 percentage points higher in strong-law countries than in 
weak-law countries. The economic significance is large. Compared with the unconditional mean LTV for 
                                                      
24 Firm size is an indicator variable that takes the value of three, two, one, and zero, for firms with net sales > $25 
million, < $25 million and > $5 million, < $5 million and > $1 million, and < $1 million, respectively. 
25 The data for these country variables come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  
26 The other control variables we considered were GDP per Capita, Private Credit to GDP, Creditor Rights, 





movables in weak-law countries of 0.454, the results represent an increase in LTV of 60.8% (= 0.276 / 
0.454). In Column 2, we add sector fixed effects to absorb sectoral differences in the use of collateral and 
LTVs, and the results remain unchanged. In Column 3, we control for other country variables and the 
movable law coefficient decreases slightly in magnitude but remains highly significant. The effects of 
Rule of Law, Property Rights, and Time to Enforce a Contract are not significant, while the effect of Time 
to Enforce Insolvency is negative and marginally significant. The LTV of movable collateral, relative to 
immovable collateral, is lower in countries with inefficient bankruptcy procedures. Overall, these results 
imply large loan-supply effects associated with strong-law status, which are more pronounced for 
movable-collateralized loans.27 
The results reported likely understate the degree to which loan supply is affected by movable 
collateral laws for two reasons. First, as explained in Subsection 3.1, in the absence of strong movable 
collateral laws, the composition of borrowers is likely to shift toward more seasoned credit risks. Second, 
improvements in collateral laws not only should increase LTVs, but they also should increase the price of 
movable assets pledged as collateral. Therefore, our results on LTV provide a conservative estimate of the 
effects of collateral law on lending supply. Given the structure of our data set, we are not able to observe 
changes in the liquidation values of particular assets. We can say, however, that the collateral price effect 
unambiguously biases our estimates toward zero. 
4.2. Slovakia reform analysis 
As we discuss in Section 2, the Slovakian reform in 2003 dramatically shifted the ability to 
collateralize movables. This enables us to perform a within-borrower analysis of the effect of this reform 
on movables lending in that country. To do so, we run the following difference-in-differences estimation:  
!!!!!!!!!!"#!" = !!+!! + !!"#$! ∗!"#$%&'! + !!!" + !!" ,          (2) 
                                                      
27 The fact that our measure of the strength of movables collateral laws has a greater effect on movable asset lending 






where LTVit is the loan-to-value ratio for a loan made to firm i in quarter t and Postt is a reform indicator 
variable that takes the value of one after January 1, 2003 and zero otherwise. Each firm included in the 
sample appears once in both the pre-reform and the post-reform period.28 The specification includes a full 
set of firm fixed effects (αi) and quarterly time fixed effects (αt). We are interested in the coefficient !, 
which is identified from the within-firm variation across time. The coefficient measures the difference 
between LTVs of loans collateralized by movable and immovable assets after the reform, relative to the 
same difference before the reform. We include time-varying borrower-level characteristics, Zit, to control 
for differences in the supply of collateral.29 
Table 3 reports the estimation results for Slovakia. Column 1 reports the results without firm 
fixed effects for reference. According to Column 2, the difference between the LTVs of movable- and 
immovable-backed loans increases by 20.1 percentage points after the passage of the law.30 The average 
LTV for movables (immovables) in Slovakia was 0.672 (0.876) prior to the reform. Hence, the results 
suggest that the pre-reform difference in LTVs across immovables and movables almost entirely 
disappeared post-reform. The magnitude of the coefficient in Table 3 (0.201) is similar to the comparable 
coefficient estimate from the cross-sectional regression in Table 2 (0.276).  
[Insert Table 3 here]  
The third column in Table 3 reports a placebo test using the experience of the Czech Republic. 
We falsely assume that this country reformed its movable collateral law at the same time as Slovakia. The 
Czech Republic is the natural placebo candidate because both countries shared a legal environment 
historically and they planned to enter the EU at the same time. The coefficient on the interaction term is 
statistically insignificant in Column 2, which shows that our results for Slovakia are not driven by other 
policies shared by the two countries that are unrelated to movable collateral reform. The last column 
                                                      
28 As before, we use only the first loan observed in each period. 
29 We cluster standard errors at the firm level. 
30 The Movable indicator varies at the firm level and is therefore absorbed by the firm fixed effects in the 





reports an additional placebo test for the remaining countries in the GlobalBank sample, which did not 
implement collateral reforms during the sample period. Here we verify that there was no general 
worldwide change in GlobalBank’s lending rules for loans collateralized by movables after January 1, 
2003. The interaction term in Column 3 is also statistically insignificant, indicating that our results are not 
driven by worldwide changes in GlobalBank’s lending rules or by global shocks affecting movable 
relative to immovable collateral. 
5. Movable collateral laws and GlobalBank’s lending: additional results 
Here we explore additional results regarding the affects of collateralization regime differences on 
GlobalBank’s lending. First, we decompose the MC Law Index into its component parts to see which 
components are the most important drivers of our results. Second, we consider how collateral regime 
differences affect the use of Supra collateral, which are assets whose value as collateral does not depend 
on the quality of a country’s collateralization regime. Third, we investigate the robustness of our findings 
to alternative ways of capturing cross-country differences in the MC Law Index. 
5.1. Movable collateral law components 
The MC Law Index measures the strength of movable collateral laws in all three components of 
secured transactions: creation, monitoring, and enforcement. In this subsection, we analyze which of these 
components matter the most. In Column 1 of Table 4, we focus on differences in the creation component 
across countries, which reflect differences in the existence of laws permitting the collateralization of 
movable assets.31 Although the effect is positive, it is not statistically significant. Column 2 focuses on 
differences in monitoring, comparing countries with and without electronic collateral registries. The 
results show that the LTV of movable collateral, relative to immovable collateral, is higher in countries 
with collateral registries in place. According to Column 3, the LTV of movable relative to immovable 
                                                      
31 The creation component corresponds to questions 1–5 of the MC Law Index. We sum these five questions for 






collateral is higher in countries that allow creditors to repossess collateral without court intervention.32 
Column 5 shows that when all three components are included simultaneously, only the perfection and 
enforcement components are significant. In sum, the existence of collateral registries and the possibility 
of out-of-court enforcement, not the mere existence of laws, drive our results.   
[Insert Table 4 here] 
In Column 4 of Table 4, we consider whether our results for out-of-court enforcement of 
movables collateral could reflect aspects of a country’s legal system that apply to immovable assets, as 
well. To consider that possibility, we construct an indicator variable for whether the countries in our 
sample permitted the out-of-court seizure of immovable collateral.33 As Column 4 shows, out-of-court 
enforcement for immovables does not enter significantly in the regression, and its presence does not affect 
our results for the importance of out-of-court seizure of movable assets. We interpret this as reflecting the 
greater importance of timely seizure of movable assets, which, unlike real estate, can depreciate quickly 
or disappear if they are not seized promptly. 
5.2. Supra-collateral analysis 
Supra collateral insulates loan contracts from local legal imperfections, either through a foreign 
enforcement of a foreign payment, a foreign-enforced guarantee, or a domestic right of setoff that does 
not depend on movable collateral laws. The LTVs for supra collateral lending are similar across 
strong-and weak-law countries, although they are slightly higher in weak-law countries (83% versus 79%; 
the difference is statistically insignificant). This suggests that, compared with the effect of the legal 
                                                      
32  Seven of the 12 GlobalBank countries and 40 of the 76 extended-sample countries permit out-of-court 
enforcement for movable collateral (see Appendix Table A6). 
33 To construct this indicator, we rely on data in Djankov, Hart, McLiesh and Shleifer (2008). We measure out-of-
court enforcement for immovables using the question of the survey on whether a country allows for an out-of-court 
procedure for real estate collateral. We collect data from Deloitte (2013) and Lex Mundi (2012) for our sample 
countries not included in Djankov, Hart, McLiesh and Shleifer (2008). The indicators for out-of-court enforcement 
of movables and immovables are positively correlated (0.44 in the GlobalBank sample and 0.36 in a broader sample 





environment on movables lending, there is less of an effect of the legal environment on supra collateral 
lending. 
To analyze the effects of collateral laws on the LTVs for supra collateral loans, we estimate 
!"#! = !! + !!!"#$%&'! + !!!"#$%! + !!!"#! ∗!"#$%&'! + !!!"#! ∗ !"#$%! + !!! + !! ,! (3) 
where Suprai is an indicator variable equal to one if the loan is collateralized by supra collateral and zero 
otherwise. The coefficient of interest is now !!, which measures the difference between LTVs of loans 
collateralized by supra and immovable assets in strong-law countries, relative to the same difference in 
weak-law countries.  
  The results reported in Table 5 for the difference between movable-collateralized and 
immovable-collateralized loans are consistent with earlier findings. As before, loans backed by movables 
in strong-law countries have LTVs that are 27.6 percentage points higher than loans backed by 
immovables, relative to weak-law countries (Column 2). We find that the difference between the LTVs of 
supra collateral and immovable-backed loans is 8.3 percentage points lower in strong-law countries than 
in weak-law countries. This result implies that while supra collateral captures a higher LTV than 
immovable assets in weak-law countries, this effect is overturned in strong-law countries. This likely 
reflects the fact that countries with weak collateral laws for movables also suffer from a relatively lower 
ability to collateralize against immovables. Borrowers in weak-law countries tend to have weaker 
borrowing options against all non-supra collateral, which pushes LTV ratios for supra loans higher than in 
strong-law countries. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
5.3. Robustness checks 
Table 6 reports various robustness tests of our LTV results in Table 2. In Column 1, we employ a 





Although the coefficient’s size is different (consistent with the change in the mean of the regressor), 
results remain highly significant. Columns 2 and 3 show that the Table 2 results are invariant to omitting 
accounts receivable or machinery from our definition of movable assets. Results are somewhat larger 
when machinery is omitted (Column 3), although the difference is not statistically significant. The larger 
coefficient magnitude for non-machinery movables can reflect selectivity bias in favor of higher-quality 
borrowers who use machinery as collateral, given that less creditworthy firms have a greater tendency to 
lease machinery (Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2009). Column 4 confines the loan sample to manufacturing firms 
(the subject of Section 6) and finds no significant difference in coefficients.  
 [Insert Table 6 here]  
Table 7 explores whether dividing countries into finer categories (instead of above- and below-
median levels of the MC Law Index) affects our LTV results. We divide countries into three groups: those 
with a low MC Law Index (the omitted category), a Middle Law group, and a High Law group. We find 
that coefficients tend to be higher for the High Law group than for the Middle Law group. Similarly, for 
the other variable analyzed in Section 6 (manufacturing production share), we find that much of the 
effects of Law is attributable to the differences between high MC Law Index values and all others.  To 
conserve space and in recognition of that fact, our subsequent tables divide countries according to Law by 
comparing the High Law group with the rest of the sample. 
 [Insert Table 7 here]  
6. Movable collateral laws and the sectoral allocation of resources 
To analyze the real consequences of collateral laws, we examine how economic activity varies 
across sectors with different natural usage of immovable assets. As a way to identify the exogenous 
(technologically given) composition of assets across sectors, we employ data on sectoral asset 
composition for the US. Presumably, in the US, which enjoys an unusually good legal framework for the 





essentially unaffected by legal shortcomings in the ability to pledge movables as collateral. This approach 
is akin to the Rajan and Zingales (1998) approach for measuring sectoral external financial dependence 
and its effects on resource allocation, as well as the work of Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011) on the 
effects of financing constraints on sectoral resource allocation and productivity in finance-dependent 
sectors.34 We make the operating assumption that the sectoral ranking of immovable intensity is common 
across the US and our sample of countries. 
We construct a sectoral index of real estate intensity as the median of the average ratio of the 
value of land and buildings to total assets across publicly traded firms in the US in each manufacturing 
sector, during the period 1984–1996.35 Fig. 2 reports the sectoral index for each of 22 two-digit 
manufacturing sectors in our sample. Clearly, large cross-sectoral differences exist in the usage of 
immovable assets within manufacturing sectors (roughly 6.5% in leather, 8.5% in machinery and 
equipment, 14.5% in furniture, and 16.5% in tobacco).  
[Insert Fig. 2 here] 
 Using UNIDO data, we calculate each sector’s share in total output by dividing sectoral output by 
aggregate manufacturing output.36 To match the time period used in the loan-level analysis, we average 
the sectoral shares between 2002 and 2004.37 In Fig. 3, we plot the MC Law Index against the output 
share of immovable-intensive sectors. We define sectors as immovable-intensive if they are above the 
median of the sectoral real estate intensity index. The figure shows that countries with weak collateral 
laws tend to allocate a greater fraction of their production toward immovable-intensive sectors.  
                                                      
34 The Rajan and Zingales (1998) approach has been criticized by Fisman and Love (2004). The Fisman and Love 
critique of Rajan and Zingales’ method for measuring external financial dependence, however, does not apply to our 
asset composition measure, as our measure focuses on asset composition, not internally generated funding, which 
Fisman and Love argue is likely to capture demand shocks.  
35 As explained in Campello and Giambona (2013), the 1984–1996 period is the only time frame for which 
Compustat decomposes the value of tangible assets into land and buildings (immovables) and machinery and 
equipment (movables). 
36 UNIDO does not provide information for Pakistan and Sri Lanka. As a result, when analyzing our GlobalBank 
sample of countries, we are left with a sample of ten countries. 





[Insert Fig. 3 here] 
Weak-law countries allocate on average 67.7% of their production to sectors intensive in real 
estate, and strong-law countries allocate only 51.1%. The difference of 16.6 percentage points is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. To analyze the effect of collateral laws on the sectoral allocation 
of resources, we run the regression 
!!!!!!!!!ℎ!"#!" = !! + !!"#! ∗ !"#! + !!! ∗ !"#! + !!" ,            (4) 
where Sharesc is the ratio of sectoral output to total output of sector s in country c. REIs is a dummy equal 
to one for sectors above the median of the sectoral index of real estate intensity and zero otherwise. The 
specification includes a full set of sector fixed effects (αs).38 The coefficient of interest is !, which 
measures the difference between the sectoral share of output allocated to immovable-intensive sectors in 
countries with strong and weak collateral laws. The regression is akin to a difference-in-differences 
estimation, in which we calculate the difference between resources allocated to sectors with different 
immovable intensities, between countries with different strengths of collateral laws. To account for the 
fact that other country characteristics could affect the sectoral allocation, we add to the specification the 
same set of country-level control variables used in Subsection 4.1, each interacted with the real estate 
intensity indicator.  
Table 8 (Columns 1–4) reports the sectoral regression results. The interaction term is negative 
and statistically significant. According to the results, the output share of the representative 
immovable-intensive sector in weak-law countries is 1.4 percentage points higher than in strong-law 
countries (Column 1). This is a large effect. Each of the ten countries has 11 immovable-intensive sectors. 
The results imply that, in the aggregate, weak–law countries allocate 15.4% more of their production to 
immovable-intensive sectors than strong-law countries (= 1.4% * 11). The effect is robust to controlling 
                                                      
38 We do not include country fixed effects in the regression because the outcome variables are shares. Country fixed 
effects would affect all sectors within a country equally, which is not possible because by definition the shares sum 





for other country characteristics related to the legal system more broadly, which we employed in Table 2 
(based on the findings of Table A3), such as the time to enforce a contract, the time to resolve insolvency, 
the rule of law, and property rights (Columns 2 and 3).39 Table A5 of the Appendix shows the same 
regressions for the allocation of sectoral employment. The results are the same, that is, the share of 
workers employed in immovable-intensive sectors in weak-law countries is 14.3 percentage points higher 
than in strong-law countries. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
Next we address endogeneity bias concerns related to reverse causality and omitted variables. To 
address the concern of reverse causality, we employ legal origin interacted with REI as an instrument for 
the interaction between Law and REI. In unreported results, we find that the first stage is strong. Legal 
origin is ranked in terms of its positive influence on collateral law as follows: English (highest), German 
(middle), and French (lowest). Our instrumental variable (IV) results are reported in Column 4 of Table 8. 
We find that the IV coefficient estimates are slightly larger in magnitude than the OLS results, but not 
statistically significantly so.40  
Next, in Columns 5–8 of Table 8, we run the same four regressions as in Columns 1–4-, but with 
the sectoral investment rate (ratio of gross investment to output) as the dependent variable.41 In theory, 
poor legal enforcement of movables collateral should bias production against the use of movables assets, 
resulting in lower capital-to-labor and lower capital-to-output ratios for industries that are intensive in 
movables. Although UNIDO does not report capital stock data, investment-to-output ratios should track 
capital-to-output ratios because, in the steady state, investment equals the sectoral output growth rate plus 
                                                      
39 Claessens and Laeven (2003) argue that weaker property rights protections against the actions of competitors lead 
firms to invest more in tangible assets relative to intangible assets. The fact that our tests are robust to controlling for 
a measure of property rights ensures that our results are not reflecting these property rights differences. 
40 The first-stage F-statistic is 12.29, which allows us to marginally reject the null hypothesis of weak instruments 
using the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values. 
41 The only difference is that the investment-rate regressions include country fixed effects, because, unlike the 





the sectoral depreciation rate on capital times the capital stock.42 Column 5 shows that the investment rate 
in immovable-intensive sectors in weak-law countries is 3 percentage points higher than in strong-law 
countries. This result is robust to controlling for other variables and to the IV estimation. 
Given the possibility that machinery (but not other movable assets) can be leased, we also 
consider whether our findings on sectoral resource allocation could differ according to differences within 
movables-intensive sectors in their relative intensity in their use of machinery, as opposed to other 
movables. For each sector, we construct indices measuring their relative intensity in machinery or in other 
movables (accounts receivable plus inventory).43 In Appendix Table A4, we report results showing that 
the effect is slightly lower for machinery-intensive sectors, consistent with the ability to lease machinery. 
However, the difference is not statistically significant. 
In addition, we examine how the change in movables collateral law in Slovakia affected the 
sectoral allocation of resources. Due to the relatively small sample size in this panel study (ten years and 
22 sectors divided between pre- and post-reform periods), our standard errors are large and our 
coefficients are estimated imprecisely. The magnitude of the estimated sectoral shift, however, is 
economically large. In Fig. 4, we plot the evolution of the share of production allocated in sectors with 
above-median real estate intensity. According to Panel A, before the 2003 reform, roughly 57% of 
Slovakia’s manufacturing output was allocated in sectors that are intensive users of real estate. After the 
reform, this share decreases steadily, reaching nearly 52% by 2007. In Panel B, we show a similar graph 
for the average output share of immovable-intensive sectors in all countries except Slovakia. The output 
share is roughly constant before and after 2003. Because none of these countries reformed their collateral 
                                                      
42 On average, sectors that are movable-intensive tend to have higher depreciation rates for capital, given that 
machinery, inventory, and accounts receivable depreciate faster than real estate. This means that our coefficients are 
biased toward zero, because the estimates implicitly assume that the sum of the sectoral growth rate and the sectoral 
depreciation rate on capital are identical across sectors. 
43 We construct a sectoral machinery intensity index and an accounts receivable plus inventory intensity index as the 
median of the average ratio of the value of machinery to total assets and the ratio of accounts receivable plus 





laws during this period, this result suggests that the Slovakia results are not driven by shocks affecting 
immovable-intensive sectors after 2003. 
[Insert Fig. 4 here] 
7. Movable collateral laws and the sectoral allocation of resources: additional results 
 In this section, we consider how differences in collateralization regimes affected the allocation of 
resources in the economy. In the preceding sections, we showed how collateral laws mattered for ability 
of borrowers to use movable assets as collateral. Here we investigate the extent to which difficulties in 
collateralizing loans with movable assets – which should be relatively important for industries that make 
intensive use of movable assets in production – affect the sectoral composition of a country’s production 
and employment. 
7.1. Extended sample of countries 
We extend our analysis beyond the sample of the GlobalBank countries. Because the World 
Bank’s Doing Business data set on movable collateral law is available beginning in 2005, we collect 
UNIDO data for 2005–2010. To ensure consistent measurement of cross-country differences in the 
quality of collateral law, we exclude countries in which jumps in the MC Law Index occur during 2005–
2010.44 There are 90 countries for which data are available from the UNIDO and Doing Business data 
sets. We drop three countries for which some sectoral output observations are missing, and we also drop 
the US given that our immovable-intensity indicator is calculated using US data. We dropped ten 
countries for which there was a jump in the MC Law Index. This leaves a sample of 76 countries.45  
                                                      
44 To extend our sample backward in time, to the 12-country sample period of 2002–2004, would have required us to 
verify (as we did for the 12 countries) that no changes in collateral law had occurred during 2002–2004 for the 90 
countries in our sample. Doing so would have been impractical for many of the countries in the UNIDO sample, due 
to lack of information. We define a jump as a change of two or more units in the MC Law Index. Our results are 
robust to using a threshold of one or three units for defining a major jump. 





We report the results in Table 9. The findings for output and investment are qualitatively similar 
to our results for the GlobalBank sample of countries, although the magnitudes of the estimates for the 
interaction term are somewhat smaller, roughly two-thirds the size of the previous estimate (= 0.009 / 
0.014). The estimates in Column 1 of Table 9 imply that the output share of the representative 
immovable-intensive sector is 0.9 percentage points higher in weak-law countries than in strong-law 
countries. This estimate implies that, in the aggregate, weak-law countries allocate 9.9% more of their 
output to immovable-intensive sectors than strong-law countries (= 0.9% * 11). In Column 4 of Table 9, 
we report the IV results. As before, IV magnitudes tend to be larger, but not different from OLS estimates 
at a high level of statistical significance. 46  According to Column 5, the investment rate in 
immovable-intensive sectors in weak-law countries is 1.4% higher than in strong-law countries. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
7.2. Movable collateral law components 
Next, as in Subsection 5.1, we analyze which components of the MC Law Index are driving the 
results. As before, we divide the MC Law Index into its three components: creation, monitoring, and 
enforcement. Columns 1–5 of Table 10 report the results for the sample of GlobalBank countries: 
Columns 6–10 for the extended sample of 76 countries. The results are similar for both sample of 
countries (although, as in Tables 8 and 9, magnitudes tend to be smaller for the extended sample) and are 
consistent with the results reported in Section 5.1, that is, the effects of the monitoring and enforcement 
components matter more than the creation component. We interpret this finding as indicating that 
collateral laws on the books, per se, are a necessary but not sufficient condition for effective 
collateralization. Having an electronic collateral registry to register security interests and allowing the 
enforcement of security interests out of court allows agents to make more effective use of the collateral 
laws on the books. As in Table 4, we include a measure of out-of-court enforcement for immovables in 
                                                      






Columns 4 and 9 of Table 10, and we find, as in Table 4, that this variable does not enter significantly, 
and its inclusion does not affect the results for out-of-court enforcement of movables. 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
7.3. Movable collateral laws and judicial efficiency 
Finally, we analyze how the effect of movable collateral laws varies with the degree of judicial 
inefficiency of an economy. As shown above, the ability to repossess collateral without having to go to 
court is one of the main factors through which collateral laws affect the sectoral allocation of resources. 
Therefore, we expect the effect of movable collateral laws to be stronger in those countries with 
inefficient judicial systems, where out-of-court enforcement is valued more. Moreover, if movable 
collateral laws merely were capturing omitted variables related more generally to the quality of the legal 
environment, then controlling for such differences would reduce the magnitude of movable collateral law 
effects.  
We divide the extended sample of 76 countries into two groups: above and below the median 
value of the Time to Enforce a Contract variable. In Column 2 of Table 11, we re-estimate the sectoral 
output regression for the above-median judicial inefficiency countries. The magnitude of the interaction 
term is large in magnitude and highly significant. For the below-median (relatively efficient) judicial 
countries (Column 3), the effect is small and not significant. A Chow test rejects the null hypothesis of 
equal coefficients across samples at the 1% level. This implies that out-of-court enforcement is working 
as a substitute for an inefficient judicial system. This also provides further evidence contrary to the view 
that the importance of movables collateral laws reflects omitted variables bias. 








In this paper, we highlight the importance of movable assets, as opposed to real estate assets, in 
providing debt capacity for firms. Our paper is the first to connect differences in the legal environments 
across countries with respect to movable collateral to the lending behavior of a global bank. We use a 
novel cross-country micro-level data set that has the unique feature of providing information regarding 
asset liquidation values, which allows us to construct meaningful loan-to-value ratios for loans 
collateralized by different types of assets. Our paper is also the first to show that collateralization laws in 
emerging market countries that discourage the use of movable assets as collateral create distortions in the 
allocation of resources that favor immovable-based production. 
We find that differences across countries in their legal systems’ ability to support the use of 
movable assets as collateral for bank loans substantially affect the ability of borrowers to gain access to 
credit. The consequences for reduced lending and constrained LTVs also are reflected in important 
differences in production. In countries with poorly developed movable collateralization laws, firms in 
sectors that exogenously rely more on movable assets in the production process tend to see a shrinkage in 
their shares of production, compared with other firms. These effects are all economically large as well as 
statistically significant. Our study has important implications for understanding how legal system 
deficiencies—specifically, the absence of effective means of collateralizing movable assets—can shape 
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Movable collateral law index
Fig. 1. Collateral law strength and the di↵erence in loan-to-value of immovable- and movable-
backed loans. The figure plots the relationship between a country’s movable collateral law index and
the di↵erence between the average loan-to-value (LTV) of GlobalBank’s loans backed by immovable
assets (real estate) and movable assets (machinery, inventory, and accounts receivable). The average





































































































































































































































Fig. 2. Sectoral index of real estate intensity. The figure plots the sectoral index of real estate
intensity for the 22 two-digit manufacturing sectors in the sample (International Standard Indus-
trial Classification, Revision 3). The index is calculated as the median of the average ratio of the
value of land and buildings to total assets across publicly traded firms in the United States in each
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Movable collateral law index
Fig. 3. Collateral law strength and the sectoral allocation of output. The figure plots the relation
between a country’s movable collateral law index and the average ratio of output in immovable–
intensive sectors to total manufacturing output. The sectoral data come from the United Nation’s
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), which includes all firms operating in each sector.
The average is taken during the period 2002–2004. Immovable–intensive sectors are those above the
median of the sectoral index of real estate intensity.
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Fig. 4. Evolution of sectoral allocation of output and employment in Slovakia and other countries.
The figure plots the evolution of the ratio of output in immovable-intensive sectors to total manu-
facturing output in Slovakia (Panel A) and the average ratio in the other nine countries (Panel B),
during the period 1999–2007. The sectoral data come from the United Nation’s Industrial Develop-
ment Organization (UNIDO), which includes all firms operating in each sector. Immovable-intensive
sectors are those above the median of the sectoral index of real estate intensity. The vertical gray line
depicts the year of the Slovakian collateral law reform (2003).
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Table 1
Loan-to-value (LTV) by collateral law strength and collateral type
The table reports the average LTV for 4,224 borrowers from GlobalBank in 12 countries with
weak and strong collateral laws, by collateral type. The average is taken during the period 2002–
2004. Strong-law countries consist of countries above the median of the movable collateral law index.
Collateral type is either Immovable (real estate) or Movable (machinery, inventory, and accounts





Number of Number of
observations LTV observations LTV LTV
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Weak-law countries
Chile 244 0.783 16 0.482 0.301
Czech Republic 364 0.784 141 0.271 0.513
India 702 0.833 116 0.506 0.327
Pakistan 42 0.838 47 0.619 0.219
Slovakia 54 0.876 25 0.672 0.204
Sri Lanka 51 0.989 5 0.835 0.154
Turkey 251 0.804 178 0.477 0.327
Strong-law countries
Hong Kong 989 0.928 420 0.861 0.068
Hungary 57 0.902 46 0.814 0.088
Malaysia 166 0.840 96 0.741 0.099
Romania 30 0.877 19 0.625 0.252
Singapore 146 0.894 19 0.737 0.157
Average weak- and strong-law countries
Weak-law countries 1,708 0.817 528 0.454 0.364
Strong-law countries 1,388 0.912 600 0.827 0.085
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Table 2
E↵ect of collateral laws on loan-to-value
























is the loan-to-value for a loan made by GlobalBank to firm i collateralized by assets that
are either immovable or movable. Law
c
is a dummy equal to one for countries above the median of
the movable collateral law index and zero otherwise. Movable is a dummy variable equal to one if
collateral is movable (machinery, inventory, and accounts receivable) and zero otherwise. Z
i
denotes
a vector of firm-level controls. X
c
is a vector of country-level controls (Time to Enforce a Contract,
Time to Resolve Insolvency, Rule of Law, and Property Rights measured as dummy variables equal
to one if above the median). The sample contains 4,224 borrowers in 12 countries during the period
2002–2004. The specification includes a full set of country fixed e↵ects (↵
c
). Columns 2–3 also include
sector fixed e↵ects (↵
s
). The standard errors are clustered using block-bootstrapping at the country
level. * and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: LTV
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Movable -0.358*** -0.359*** -0.291*** -0.361***
(0.046) (0.053) (0.065) (0.060)
Law⇥Movable 0.276*** 0.277*** 0.210*** 0.238***
(0.047) (0.057) (0.062) (0.063)
Time to Enforce a Contract⇥Movable 0.015
(0.055)
Time to Resolve Insolvency⇥Movable -0.121*
(0.071)





Firm ratings Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm size Yes Yes Yes Yes
Balance sheet data (four ratios) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed e↵ects
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector No Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 4,224 4,224 4,224 4,224
R-squared 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.51
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Table 3
E↵ect of Slovakia’s collateral law reform on loan-to-value


















is the loan-to-value for a loan made by GlobalBank to firm i collateralized by assets
that are either immovable or movable. Movable is a dummy variable equal to one if collateral is
movable (machinery, inventory, and accounts receivable) and zero otherwise. Post
t
is a dummy equal
to one after January 1, 2003, the implementation date for the Slovakia reform, and zero otherwise. Z
it
denotes a vector of time varying firm-level controls. To construct the pre- and post-reform samples
we include all borrowers present in the pre-reform period and follow them post-reform. We include
one observation per borrower in each of the pre- and post-reform periods. The sample in Columns 1
and 2 is for borrowers in Slovakia only and contains 55 borrowers. The placebo sample in Column 3 is
for borrowers in the Czech Republic only and contains 261 borrowers. The placebo sample in Column
4 includes borrowers from all countries excluding Slovakia and contains 2,018 borrowers. The main
specification in Columns 2–4 includes a full set of borrower fixed e↵ects (↵
i
) and quarterly time fixed
e↵ects (↵
t
). The standard errors are clustered at the borrower level in Columns 1–3 and clustered






Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Movable -0.203***
(0.033)
Post⇥Movable 0.223*** 0.201*** 0.003 0.009
(0.050) (0.074) (0.026) (0.011)
Firm controls
Firm ratings Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm size Yes Yes Yes Yes
Balance sheet data (four ratios) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed e↵ects
Borrower No Yes Yes Yes
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 110 110 522 4,036
R-squared 0.37 0.79 0.89 0.80
45
Table 4
E↵ect of collateral law components on loan-to-value




















is the loan-to-value for a loan made by GlobalBank to firm i collateralized by assets that
are either immovable or movable. LawComponent
c
denotes each of the three components of the movable
collateral law index. Creation is a dummy equal to one for countries with the sum of the first five
features of MC Law Index above the median and zero otherwise, Registry is a dummy equal to one for
countries with an electronic collateral registry and zero otherwise, Out-of-Court is a dummy equal to
one for countries that allow out-of-court enforcement for movables and zero otherwise, Out-of-Court
Immov is a dummy equal to one for countries that allow out-of-court enforcement for immovables
and zero otherwise. Movable is a dummy variable equal to one if collateral is movable (machinery,
inventory, and accounts receivable) and zero otherwise. Z
i
denotes a vector of firm-level controls.
The sample contains 4,224 borrowers in 12 countries during the period 2002–2004. The specification
includes a full set of country fixed e↵ects (↵
c
) and sector fixed e↵ects (↵
s
). The standard errors
are clustered using block-bootstrapping at the country level. *** denotes statistical significance at 1
percent level.
Dependent variable: LTV
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Movable -0.257*** -0.355*** -0.364*** -0.364*** -0.321***










Firm ratings Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm size Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Balance sheet data (four ratios) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed e↵ects
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 4,224 4,224 4,224 4,224 4,224
R-squared 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51
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Table 5
E↵ect of collateral laws on loan-to-value: supra collateral







+  1Movablei +  2Suprai +  1Lawc ⇥Movablei +  2Lawc ⇥ Suprai +  Zi + "i,
where LTV
i
is the loan-to-value for a loan made by GlobalBank to firm i collateralized by assets that
are immovable, movable, or Supra collateral. Law
c
is a dummy equal to one for countries above the
median of the movable collateral law index and zero otherwise. Movable is a dummy variable equal to
one if collateral is movable (machinery, inventory, and accounts receivable) and zero otherwise. Supra
is a dummy variable equal to one if collateral is supra (bank guarantees, financial securities, and
cash held with the bank) and zero otherwise. Z
i
denotes a vector of firm-level controls. The sample
contains 4,691 borrowers in 12 countries during the period 2002–2004. The specification includes a
full set of country fixed e↵ects (↵
c
) and sector fixed e↵ects (↵
s
). The standard errors are clustered












Firm ratings Yes Yes
Firm size Yes Yes








E↵ect of collateral laws on loan-to-value: robustness checks




















is the loan-to-value for a loan made by GlobalBank to firm i collateralized by assets that
are either immovable or movable. Law
c
is a dummy equal to one for countries above the median of the
movable collateral law index and zero otherwise. Movable is a dummy variable equal to one if collateral
is movable (machinery, inventory, and accounts receivable) and zero otherwise. Z
i
denotes a vector
of firm-level controls. The sample for the main tests contains 4,224 borrowers in 12 countries during





). Column 1 employs the original movable collateral law index, which ranges from
zero to seven. Columns 2 and 3 examine alternative movables classifications by excluding accounts
receivable (186 observations) and machinery (341 observations) respectively. Column 4 contains only
manufacturing firms (1,655 observations). The standard errors are clustered using block-bootstrapping





Alternative Inventory receivable Manufacturing
collateral law and machinery and inventory only
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Movable -0.535*** -0.309*** -0.381*** -0.323***
(0.119) (0.026) (0.056) (0.056)
Law⇥Movable 0.062*** 0.232*** 0.311*** 0.206**
(0.019) (0.036) (0.075) (0.090)
Firm controls
Firm ratings Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm size Yes Yes Yes Yes
Balance sheet data (four ratios) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed e↵ects
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 4,224 4,038 3,883 1,655
R-squared 0.49 0.38 0.38 0.47
48
Table 7
E↵ect of collateral laws: alternative divisions of sample









+  1Middle Lawc ⇥Movablei +  2High Lawc ⇥Movablei +  Zi + "i,
where LTV
i
is the loan-to-value for a loan made by GlobalBank to firm i collateralized by assets that
are either immovable or movable. Collateral law strength is categorized by three groups. Low Law
denotes a movable collateral law index of less than five (omitted coe cient), Middle Law denotes
a movable collateral law index of five or six, and High Law denotes a movable collateral law index
of seven. Movable is a dummy variable equal to one if collateral is movable (machinery, inventory,
and accounts receivable) and zero otherwise. Z
i
denotes a vector of firm-level controls. The sample
contains 4,224 borrowers in 12 countries during the period 2002–2004. The specification includes a
full set of country fixed e↵ects (↵
c
) and sector fixed e↵ects (↵
s
). The standard errors are clustered
using block-bootstrapping at the country level. ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 5 and







High Law⇥Movable 0.281*** 0.258***
(0.060) (0.060)
Firm controls
Firm ratings Yes Yes
Firm size Yes Yes








E↵ect of collateral laws on sectoral allocation of output and investment rate: GlobalBank sample




















is either the average ratio of sectoral output to total manufacturing output of sector s in
country c or the average ratio of gross fixed capital formation to output of sector s in country c.
The average is taken during the period 2002–2004. Law
c
is a dummy equal to one for countries with
movable collateral law index above six and zero otherwise. REI
s
is a dummy equal to one for sectors
above the median of the sectoral index of real estate intensity and zero otherwise. X
c
is a vector of
country-level controls (Time to Enforce a Contract, Time to Resolve Insolvency, Rule of Law, and
Property Rights measured as dummy variables equal to one if above the median). All specifications
contain a full set of sector fixed e↵ects (↵
s
), and Specifications 4–6 also include a full set of country
fixed e↵ects (↵
c
). The sample consists of the ten GlobalBank countries and 22 sectors. Columns
1–2 and 4–5 report the results using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Columns 3 and 6 report the
results using instrumental variables (IV), where the instrument for the interaction between Law and
REI is the interaction between legal origin and REI. The standard errors are clustered using block-
bootstrapping at the country level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1
percent levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: Output share Dependent variable: Investment rate
OLS OLS OLS IV OLS OLS OLS IV
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Law⇥REI -0.014*** -0.012* -0.010* -0.021** -0.030** -0.022* -0.029* -0.045*
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.021)
Time to Enforce a Contract⇥REI 0.001 -0.007
(0.002) (0.004)
Time to Resolve Insolvency⇥REI 0.001 0.003
(0.002) (0.002)
Rule of Law⇥REI 0.005 0.007
(0.019) (0.014)
Property Rights⇥REI 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.000)
Fixed e↵ects
Country No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of countries 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Number of observations 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220
R-squared 0.376 0.368 0.443 0.374 0.539 0.600 0.505 0.533
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Table 9
E↵ect of collateral laws on sectoral allocation of output and investment rate: extended sample




















is either the average ratio of sectoral output to total manufacturing output of sector s in
country c or the average ratio of gross fixed capital formation to output of sector s in country c.
The average is taken during the period 2002–2004. Law
c
is a dummy equal to one for countries with
movable collateral law index above six and zero otherwise. REI
s
is a dummy equal to one for sectors
above the median of the sectoral index of real estate intensity and zero otherwise. X
c
is a vector of
country-level controls (Time to Enforce a Contract, Time to Resolve Insolvency, Rule of Law, and
Property Rights measured as dummy variables equal to one if above the median). All specifications
contain a full set of sector fixed e↵ects (↵
s
), and specifications 4–6 also include a full set of country
fixed e↵ects (↵
c
). The extended sample consists of 76 (52) countries for the output share (investment
rate) regressions and 22 sectors. Columns 1–2 and 4–5 report the results using Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS). Columns 3 and 6 report the results using instrumental variables (IV), where the instrument for
the interaction between Law and REI is the interaction between legal origin and REI. The standard
errors are clustered using block-bootstrapping at the country level. *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: Output share Dependent variable: Investment rate
OLS OLS OLS IV OLS OLS OLS IV
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Law⇥REI -0.009*** -0.008** -0.008** -0.012* -0.017** -0.014 -0.019 -0.025*
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.019) (0.012)
Time to Enforce a Contract⇥REI 0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.005)
Time to Resolve Insolvency⇥REI 0.001 0.004
(0.001) (0.002)
Rule of Law⇥REI 0.007 0.007
(0.017) (0.012)
Property Rights⇥REI 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Fixed e↵ects
Country No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of countries 76 76 76 76 52 52 52 52
Number of observations 1,672 1,672 1,672 1,672 1,144 1,144 1,144 1,144






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































E↵ect of collateral laws on sectoral allocation of output: role of judicial ine ciency














is the average ratio of sectoral output to total manufacturing output of sector s in
country c. The average is taken during the period 2002–2004. Law
c
is a dummy equal to one for
countries with movable collateral law index above six and zero otherwise. REI
s
is a dummy equal
to one for sectors above the median of the sectoral index of real estate intensity and zero otherwise.
The specification contains a full set of sector fixed e↵ects (↵
s
). The sample in Column 1 includes
76 countries and 22 sectors. Column 2 includes countries above the median of the variable Time to
Enforce a Contract (42 countries). Column 3 includes countries below the median of Time to Enforce
a Contract (34 countries). The standard errors are clustered using block-bootstrapping at the country





Variable (1) (2) (3)
Law⇥REI -0.009*** -0.013*** -0.005
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Fixed e↵ects
Sector Yes Yes Yes
Number of countries 76 42 34
Number of observations 1,672 924 748
R-squared 0.451 0.449 0.476
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Table A1
Descriptive statistics for GlobalBank sample
The table reports descriptive statistics for loan-to-value (LTV) for 4,691 borrowers from GlobalBank
in 12 countries, by collateral type. The average is taken during the period 2002–2004. Strong-law
countries consist of countries above the median of the movable collateral law index. Collateral type is
either Immovable (real estate), Movable (machinery, inventory, and accounts receivable), or Supra.
There are 3,096, 1,128, and 467 borrowers pledging immovable, movable, and supra assets, respectively.
Number of Mean Median Standard 25th 75th
Country observations deviation percentile percentile
Panel A: Immovable asset collateral
Chile 244 0.783 0.735 0.136 0.726 0.888
Czech Republic 364 0.784 0.811 0.140 0.685 0.864
Hong Kong 989 0.928 0.952 0.092 0.935 0.992
Hungary 57 0.902 0.995 0.154 0.907 1.000
India 702 0.833 0.800 0.094 0.750 0.850
Malaysia 166 0.840 0.903 0.162 0.734 0.997
Pakistan 42 0.838 0.824 0.165 0.675 1.000
Romania 30 0.877 0.877 0.098 0.824 0.990
Singapore 146 0.894 0.986 0.148 0.829 1.000
Slovakia 54 0.876 0.855 0.098 0.778 0.995
Sri Lanka 51 0.989 0.992 0.012 0.973 1.000
Turkey 251 0.804 0.771 0.145 0.752 0.967
All 3,096 0.860 0.864 0.131 0.750 0.992
Panel B: Movable asset collateral
Chile 16 0.482 0.481 0.191 0.255 0.675
Czech Republic 141 0.271 0.175 0.220 0.113 0.315
Hong Kong 420 0.861 0.932 0.136 0.783 0.944
Hungary 46 0.814 0.868 0.193 0.767 0.924
India 116 0.506 0.378 0.311 0.203 0.828
Malaysia 96 0.741 0.874 0.268 0.309 0.938
Pakistan 47 0.619 0.854 0.372 0.177 0.988
Romania 19 0.625 0.723 0.173 0.527 0.824
Singapore 19 0.737 0.746 0.143 0.686 0.833
Slovakia 25 0.672 0.682 0.117 0.630 0.783
Sri Lanka 5 0.835 0.816 0.113 0.779 0.923
Turkey 178 0.477 0.452 0.192 0.342 0.593
All 1,128 0.652 0.748 0.295 0.342 0.928
Panel C: Supra–collateral
Chile 69 0.840 1.000 0.235 0.671 1.000
Czech Republic 104 0.794 0.730 0.135 0.708 0.956
Hong Kong 4 0.814 0.950 0.306 0.647 0.981
Hungary 6 0.917 0.950 0.098 0.800 1.000
India – – – – – –
Malaysia 113 0.770 0.800 0.190 0.631 0.928
Pakistan 18 0.966 1.000 0.072 0.961 1.000
Romania 92 0.802 0.900 0.221 0.722 0.956
Singapore 35 0.796 0.820 0.181 0.666 0.969
Slovakia 23 0.832 0.910 0.178 0.771 0.997
Sri Lanka – – – – – –
Turkey 3 0.987 1.000 0.022 0.962 1.000
All 467 0.808 0.884 0.192 0.706 0.979
A1
Table A2
Frequency and loan-to-value (LTV) by collateral type
The table reports the frequency of di↵erent types of collateral for the United States, based on the
Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF). The SSBF, from the Federal Reserve Board, provides
information on small businesses in the United States. We use the latest version available: 2003. SSBF
has separate collateral information on six di↵erent types of loans, among which five (lines of credit,
mortgages, motor vehicle loans, machinery loans, and other loans) can be secured. Up to three loans
for each type can be reported in the survey, meaning a firm can report up to 15 secured loans. We
treat each loan as an individual observation and focus only on secured loans that are collateralized
by one type of asset class. To make a comparison with our study, we examine inventory or accounts
receivable, business equipment or vehicles, and real estate in the SSBF survey and estimate frequencies
by dividing the number of each collateral type by the total number of the loans in that collateral class.
The table also reports the frequency and average LTV for 4,224 borrowers from GlobalBank in 12
countries with weak and strong collateral laws, by collateral type. The average is taken during the
period 2002–2004. Strong-law countries consist of countries above the median of the movable collateral
law index. Collateral type is either Immovable (real estate) or Movable (machinery, inventory, and
accounts receivable). There are 3,096 and 1,128 borrowers pledging immovable and movable assets,
respectively. For the 1,128 movable asset loans, there are 341, 601, and 186 borrowers pledging
machinery, inventory, and accounts receivable, respectively.
Immovable Assets Machinery Inventory and Accounts Receivable
Country Frequency LTV Frequency LTV Frequency LTV
United States 37.03% NA 45.69% NA 17.27% NA
GlobalBank countries
Full sample 73.10% 0.864 8.34% 0.736 18.56% 0.630
Weak-law countries 76.39% 0.817 3.76% 0.653 19.86% 0.534

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































E↵ect of collateral laws on sectoral allocation of output: alternative sectoral indices














is the average ratio of sectoral output to total manufacturing output of sector s in
country c. The average is taken during the period 2002–2004. Law
c
is a dummy equal to one
for countries with movable collateral law index above six and zero otherwise. RealEstate Intensity,
(AccRec+Inv) Intensity, and Machinery Intensity are dummies equal to one for sectors above the
median of the sectoral index of real estate intensity, (accounts receivable + inventory) intensity, and
machinery intensity, respectively, and zero otherwise. The specification includes a full set of sector
fixed e↵ects (↵
s
). The sample consists of the ten GlobalBank countries. The standard errors are
clustered using block-bootstrapping at the country level. * and ** denote statistical significance at
the 10 and 5 percent levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: Share
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Law⇥RealEstate Intensity -0.014** -0.025** -0.022** -0.027**
(0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Law⇥(AccRec+Inv) Intensity 0.015** 0.026** 0.021**
(0.006) (0.010) (0.009)
Law⇥Machinery Intensity 0.011* 0.019** 0.010
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
Fixed e↵ects
Sector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of countries 10 10 10 10 10 10
Number of observations 220 220 220 220 220 220
R-squared 0.376 0.376 0.373 0.398 0.391 0.401
A4
Table A5
E↵ect of collateral laws on sectoral allocation of employment


















is the average ratio of sectoral employment to total manufacturing employment of sector
s in country c. The average is taken during the period 2002-2004. Law
c
is a dummy equal to one for
countries with movable collateral law index above six and zero otherwise. REI
s
is a dummy equal
to one for sectors above the median of the sectoral index of real estate intensity and zero otherwise.
X
c
is a vector of country-level controls (Time to Enforce a Contract and Time to Resolve Insolvency,
measured as dummy variables equal to one if above the median). The specification includes a full set
of sector fixed e↵ects (↵
s
). The sample includes ten countries and 22 sectors. The standard errors are
clustered using block-bootstrapping at the country level. OLS denotes ordinary least squares and IV
denotes instrumental variables. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10 and 5 percent levels,
respectively.
Dependent variable: Share
Original sample Extended sample
OLS OLS IV OLS OLS IV
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Law⇥REI -0.013** -0.014* -0.019* -0.009* -0.007* -0.022**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009)
Time to Enforce a Contract⇥REI -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Time to Resolve Insolvency⇥REI 0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.001)
Fixed e↵ects
Sector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of countries 10 10 10 66 66 66
Number of observations 220 220 220 1,289 1,289 1,289
R-squared 0.356 0.363 0.354 0.367 0.368 0.364
A5
Table A6
Countries in extended sample




















17.- Costa Rica 0







































57.- Puerto Rico 1
58.- Republic of Korea 1














73.- United Kingdom 1
74.- Uruguay 1
75.- Vietnam 1
76.- Yemen 0
A6
